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136When citing this paper, please use the full journal title Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical SciencesPhilosophy of race has become a multi-faceted subfield of phi-
losophy, drawing on philosophy of biology, metaphysics, philoso-
phy of language, ethics, and political philosophy. Race cuts across
disciplinary lines within philosophy. Moreover, disciplines outside
philosophydincluding population genetics, anthropology, sociol-
ogy, and educationdhave much to contribute to discourse about
race. A persistent danger of interdisciplinary conversation is that of
talking past each other. For instance, scholars in different disci-
plines have distinct race concepts and use local intellectual ma-
chinery to address questions about race. One simple way to address
these issues is to have the relevant parties meet each other
frequently and repeatedly. But there are some barriers to this
strategy. It requires openness, patience, and charity from the par-
ticipants, and physical proximity is an important consideration.
We realized that our own geographic regiondthe San Francisco
Bay Areadprovided the necessary concentration of open, patient,
and charitable scholars from many disciplines interested in race.
During the 2013e2014 academic year, our group of biologists, phi-
losophers, and social scientistsmet for twoworkshops (Stanford, UC
Davis) and a public conference (UC Santa Cruz) to discuss a variety of
concerns surrounding genomics and race. As a group we shared a
commitment to thinking critically about how theoretical population
genetics and genomics conceptualize andmodel certain constructs,
such as “populations,” which, in turn, are deemed by some to be
“races,” as theoretical achievements move from a circumscribed
biological domain out to the general public. Therewas of course not
complete agreement, but we benefited tremendously from learning
from each other. Indeed, we believe the papers in this special issue
are evidence that we are now a group of philosophically-informed
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9-8486/ 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.In the spirit of interdisciplinarity, and in the context of the
explicit “talking points” topics presented by one of us (PI Winther)
during the Stanford Fall 2013 meeting, organized by Edge and
Rosenberg (topics found below), three themes ran through our
group discussions and are evident in the papers in this issue:
1. Populations and races (Millstein; Winther, Giordano, Edge, and
Nielsen)
2. Examining controversies (Kaplan, Pigliucci, and Banta; Edge and
Rosenberg; Spencer)
3. Pragmatics (Lorusso and Bacchini; Donovan)
With respect to the first theme, our group addressed a variety of
concepts of “population” and “race” and the implications of find-
ings concerning human populations for our understanding of hu-
man races. In her contribution to this issue, Millstein adds an
explicit temporal component to her causal interactionist popula-
tion concept (2009, 2010) to help shed light on our understandings
of race. In particular, she explores three “puzzles” that illustrate
how temporality is crucial when thinking about race. For instance,
how can we make sense of concepts of race that incorporate a
concept of population if a person can be a member of more than
one race at the same time but cannot be part of more than one
population at the same time? On the other hand, Winther, Gior-
dano, Edge, and Nielsen distinguish three kinds of populations,
which play distinct roles in three research contexts: theory, labo-
ratory, and field. They argue that confusions have arisen from
conflations among the three. Each of these papers thus examines a
key notion of evolution and ecology, “population,” and its complex
relationship to a simultaneously narrower and broader concept,
“race.”
Not surprisingly, discussions surrounding race have produced a
number of biological and philosophical controversies, some of
them longstanding ones. As a second theme of our special issue, a
number of authors analysed some of these controversies. Kaplan,
Pigliucci, and Banta examine the dispute between Morton (1849)
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(contra Lewis et al., 2011) that Gould was right to reject Morton’s
analysis as inappropriate and misleading, but that he was wrong to
believe that a more appropriate analysis was available. Edge and
Rosenberg weigh in on the so-called “Lewontin-Edwards debate”
(Kaplan & Winther, 2013; Winther, 2014), a disagreement over the
implications of human genetic diversity for human ancestry, by
modelling the mapping between genotype and phenotype and
showing that when it comes to differences in neutral phenotypes
across populations, Lewontin-type single-locus results (Lewontin,
1972) are more informative than Edwards-type multi-locus classi-
fication (Edwards, 2003). Spencer turns from these two biological
controversies to a philosophical one, with an examination of some
philosophical arguments against and for the biological reality of
race. He argues that four of the concerns that have been raised stem
from implausible assumptions about the relevant meaning of ‘race’
or the nature of biological realism. Interestingly, Kaplan, Pigliucci,
and Banta try to dissolve a controversy; Edge and Rosenberg show
that both sides of a controversy are right; and Spencer defends one
of two sides of a controversy.
Many important questions concern the “input” (biology) and
“output” (social consequences) of theorizing about race, and do not
hinge on the metaphysics of race as such. In other words, whether
race is real or not, and inwhich senses, matters mainly in so far as it
might make a difference in biomedical, forensic, anthropological,
psychological, and political, including identity politics, contexts.
Bluntly put, ontology serves pragmatics, giving rise to the third
theme. Lorusso and Bacchini argue that differences in racedor,
better, in racial self-identificationdmay be used as proxies for
differences in risk-related exposomes and epigenomes in the
context of the United States. However, their conclusion comes with
a caveat. There is no guarantee that using self-identified races in
epidemiology and biomedical research will always be beneficial;
positive and negative consequences must be balanced, and risks
assessed. Donovan’s contribution is also interestingly normative,
outlining the necessary subject matter knowledge about race that
teachers should possess if they desire to teach about human genetic
variation without promoting racialism. This knowledge base is
biologically and politically sensitive to the state-of-art on genomics
and philosophy of race represented in this volume. Both papers
shed light on contexts outside of theoretical biology and philosophy
where race has deep impacts, and where constant critical reflection
and vigilance is necessarydbiomedicine and pedagogy.
We have addressed difficult technical matters both on their own
terms and in social contexts, emphasizing pragmatics but also
touching on metaphysics at times. Our inter-disciplinary group
excelled at dialogue, learning from one another, and experimenting
with new perspectives on genomics and philosophy of race. We
look forward to continuing that dialogue with the readership of
Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sci-
ences.
“Genomics and Philosophy of Race” Talking Points
(2013e2014)
Presented at the Stanford Fall 2013 workshop.
Co-authored by Winther, Millstein, Nielsen, and Michael D.
Edge.
This year’s topic is “Genomics and Philosophy of Race.” Different
researchers might work on distinct subsets of the six thematic
clusters below, which are neither mutually exclusive nor collec-
tively exhaustive:
(1) Concepts of ‘Race’: What is the relation of ‘race’ to standard
terms and concepts in the biological literature, includingancestry, clade, cluster, ethnicity, group, population, and sub-
species? Did these concepts historically replace and realign
the post-WW II term ‘race’? (UNESCO 1952, Reardon, 2005)
For instance, consider the concepts of ‘population’ and
‘metapopulation.’ (Millstein, 2010) These concepts seem to
play a central but complex role in the studies of the evolution
and population structure of Homo sapiens.What is meant by
these concepts in data collection and data analysis? Are the
implicit definitions defensible? Moreover, how does recent
work on archaic hominins change our understanding of
‘subspecies’ and how to draw boundaries across and within
species? And what role do vernacular terms such as ‘tribe’
(TallBear, 2008) or the ordinary concept of ‘race’ (Hardimon,
2003, 2013) play in our conceptualizations of race? Do
these concepts imply some kind of (imagined) purity, or is
‘multi-raciality’ always already an accepted possibility (2.9%
of the USA population, United States Census Bureau, 2012)?
What are the normative and technical consequences of using
potential euphemisms for the term ‘race’?
(2) Mathematical Modeling of Human History and Population
Structure: What are the aims and methods of various
mathematical models of human populations? Which sorts
of genetic distance measures (e.g., Nei, 1987; Reynolds, Weir,
& Cockerham, 1983) and algorithmic procedures (e.g.,
Felsenstein, 2004; Nielsen, Mountain, Huelsenbeck, &
Slatkin, 1998) can and should be used for inferring the hu-
man family tree (e.g., Cavalli-Sforza, Menozzi, & Piazza, 1994;
Gannett & Griesemer, 2004)? How do we make sense of a
putative controversy (the “Lewontin-Edwards conundrum”)
between, on the one hand, those who emphasize Lewontin’s
well-known 1972 result that only approximately 5% of all
genetic difference is found among racial groups (e.g., Brown
& Armelagos, 2001; Kaplan &Winther, 2013, 2014; Lewontin,
1972; Winther, 2014), and the recent results that human
populations cluster nicely, and that individuals can be
reliably assigned to clusters, given enough loci (e.g.,
Huelsenbeck & Andolfatto, 2007; Rosenberg et al., 2002; see
also Edwards, 2003)? In short, which assumptions go into
modeling methods (e.g., Winther, 2006) that (i) assess ge-
netic variance within and among pre-defined groups (ii)
aggregate sampled individuals into robust a posteriori clus-
ters, or (iii) infer our history as a species, including archaic
hominins such as Neanderthals and Denisovans (e.g., Liang &
Nielsen, 2011; Winther, 2011)?
(3) Data and Technologies of Human Genomics: For data
collection, biologists must make assumptions about the
number of sampled populations, population delineation,
ways of sampling individuals from particular populations
(e.g., Weiss & Fullerton, 2005), statistical standardization of
numbers and distributions of individuals in different pop-
ulations, and even about potential functional relations
among loci, only some of which may be sampled (e.g.,
Nielsen, 2009). Subsequent data analyses may be seen as
confirming or disconfirming initial assumptions. Moreover,
assumptions about the capabilities and limits of technologies
of sequencing and biomedicine are also at play (e.g., Fujimura
& Rajagopalan, 2011; TallBear, 2008). What do genomic bi-
ologists and lab technicians concerned with data manage-
ment and technologies actually say about how they collect,
share, and interpret relevant data?
(4) Biological Reality of Race: Do human races exist, and if so in
which sense of the term? Can and should genomics tell us
whether races are really real, potentially through mathe-
matical machinery that simply identifies abstract pop-
ulations as units of evolution? Or does genomicsdand the
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sumptions permeated with our social racialized ontology,
thereby making claims about the objective existence of races
difficult to justify? Some philosophers argue for a social
constructivist account of race (e.g., Appiah, 2006; Haslanger,
2008); others for a pragmatic or deflationist account (e.g.,
Gannett, 2007; Hardimon, 2013); still others for a conven-
tionalist account of bio-genomic ‘race’ (Kaplan & Winther,
2013; Winther & Kaplan, 2013; see Mills, 1988 for a useful
albeit slightly incomplete taxonomy of positions). The
concept ‘race’ is linked with the philosophical literature on
natural kinds (e.g., Hacking, 2005; Kitcher, 2007), in part
because of interest in whether inferences about medical
conditions and treatments (e.g., Risch, Buchard, Ziv, & Tang,
2002; Taylor et al., 2004; Wade, 2004, 2014), or about IQ
and cognitive capacities (e.g., Evans et al., 2005; see
Richardson, 2011 for a critique), can be underwritten using
race. To what extent is race real, and which inferences about
the body and mind could it ground?
(5) Racialized Selves in a Global Context: How is the self
impacted by genomic practices? How do the aims of genomic
research inform the racial identifications that are assumed in,
and result from, data management and modeling practices?
There are “looping effects” (Hacking, 2007) among (i) ex-
perts, (ii) academic witnesses, (iii) participants (and their
genomes) from indigenous populations (e.g., Yanomami,
Japanese, and Danesdbasically any non-admixed popula-
tion), (iv) self-conceptualizations, (v) institutions, and (vi)
the racialized classifications themselves. An investigation of
these looping effects makes explicit the making, unmaking,
and realignment of ‘race’ in our PostGenomic “Biology 2.0”
Age (see article in The Economist), at both the individual and
institutional level. Identifications empower. They also make
us vulnerable.
(6) Pragmatic Consequences of ‘Race Talk’ among Biologists:
When biologists talk about race, continental origin, or clus-
ters representing human variation, what are the social con-
sequences? How is biological discourse about human
diversity reflected in science journalism and science educa-
tion? Does the use of concepts like population structure
reinforce lay beliefs about putative genetically-based group
differences on human traits like intelligence? If biological
race talk may have harmful pragmatic consequences, how
should biologists respond? The stances of biologists on race
have biomedical and public health implications (e.g.
Bergstrom, Garratt, & Sheehan-Connor, 2009; Risch et al.,
2002), and they are passed on to the public via media outlets,
often in forms over which they have limited control (Rachul,
Ouellette, & Caulfield, 2011). Reporting on race can influence
the ways laypeople make sense of new information about
group differences (Condit & Bates, 2005). Given these varied
considerations, howcan biologists thoughtfully proceedwith
their research and dissemination practices?
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